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PHASES AND PRESENT TASKS 
OF THE FIGHT AGAINTS BUREAUCRACY 
1. In the work of state organization and in political sciences a fight 
against thé bureaucratic deformation of our mechanism has been taken up 
time and again, sharply or indirectly. It is doubtless that the tasks of the fight 
against bureaucracy, its directions, methods in the single sectors of the deve-
lopment of the people's democracy could be determined in different ways 
under the given historical conditions. It is reflected very veil in the political 
literature, and in the concrete work of organization, as well, what a multi-
fold phenomenon bureaucracy is with its more and more recent problems. 
B e f o r e t h e y e a r of change the liquidation of the most reactionary organiza-
tional and functional manifestations of the old state machinery was going on 
in the spirit of the fight against bureaucracy.1 From 1948, this slogan has 
culminated in a programme of destroying completely the machinery inhe-
rited from the bourgeois State.2 Some were inclined to expect from the solu-
tion of this task that, on the basis of its perfect performance, under socialist 
conditions, the problem of bureaucracy can essentially be dropped. The bu-
reaucratic phenomena that can be found in the mechanism of the dictator-
ship of the proletariate were considered — after the old state machinery 
h a v i n g been des t royed — to be a surviving remainder of the former state 
bureaucracy of the exploiters. T h a t is vitalized or renewed by the influence 
still exerted here and there by the capitalistic surroundings, by the class of 
exploiters on the socialist state organization; it can, however, be completely 
eliminated in a comparatively short time by making the class-warfare more 
consequent and educating the socialist mind of people. 
The classics of Marxism did not at all . take bureaucracy for an adver-
sary to be overcome so easily, although it was first of all Lenin who treated 
of its problems emerging in the course of the building up of Socialism. At 
the beginning of eliminating the subjectivist mistakes committed in the pe-
riod of the personal cult, and in the political sciences at the liberation from 
the limiting shackles of the dogmatic outlook, one began to see in it some 
t endenc i e s t h a t w e r e much more difficult to be eliminated, renewing time 
and time again even in the new circumstances on the basis of certain con-
1 Cf. Dr. Lajos Szamel, Development of socialist democracy and demolition of 
the bourgeois bureaucracy in sur administration. Studia Juridica Auctoritate Uni-
versitatis Pécs Publicata. (Publisher of school-books). Budapest, 1960, pp. 3. et sq.. 
(Hungarian). 
2 Following the year of change, a monograph was published about the essence 
of bureaucracy and about measures and methods of the fight against it, by Tivadar 
Gál, Rationalization of the administration (State and Administration, Vol. 1950, Nos 
€—7, pp. 423 et sq. Hungarian) and by Ferenc Vida, Nation of bureauracy and the 
ideological fight against it (State and Administration, Vol. 1951, Nos. 11—12, pp. 
>615 et sq. Hungarian). 
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ditions. As opposed to the opinion comprehending bureaucracy as a bourgeois 
remainder of state structure and of consciousness surviving even in the per iod 
of Socialism, the attention was called on another opinion to the essential, ele-
m e n t s of rea l i ty considering bureaucracy a consequence of an extremely fast 
state-organizing work. The organizatory work of immense r h y t h m 'after t h e 
year of- change — they said — is accompanied perforce by some distortions? 
that could supposedly have been avoided if there had been time to measure: 
the effects more exactly. The fight between 1954 and 1956 againts bureauc-
ratic tendencies was carried on, in fact, on the basis of the programme o£ 
correcting the mistakes made during building socialism.3 In 1956 there were 
taken still more definite measures for correcting the organisatory faults tha,t 
had caused bureaucratic distortions in the course of the Socialist t ransforma-
tion. Construction and function of the mechanism have particulary two major-
problems of being improved. First of all, a decentralization of state administ-
ration must begin, by increasing the independence of the organs of l o w e r 
degree, giving up competences. Another major task is to simplify the state 
apparatus. In connection with that, the thought of the reform of the administ-
rative country-planning and that of the organisatory simplification of state 
administration, etc. have arisen.4 
These purposes could anyhow be realized organizedly but after the con-
solidation of 1957. At the beginning of the two-front fight of the Revolutio-
nary Workers and Peasants Government it was more and more realized, as. 
well; that in the life of our socialist State the bureaucratic tendencies, were 
not only necessary consequencies of a fast rhythm of the earlier work of orga-
nization but, in a high degree, also the mistakes of the earlier leading which, 
could have been avoided during building Socialism. F r o m t h a t t ime, t h e f i gh t , 
against the bureaucratic elements of state organization has take place in the-
sp i r i t of t he consequent and complete elimination of the mistakes committed,, 
in the "period of personal cult, and in that of the reorganization of the appa-
ratus in compliance with the new exigencies. 
From 1957 our Government have taken a long series of measures pushing: 
the earlier bureaucratic phenomena into the background and even ceasing; 
them here and there completely. There could be obtained considerable results:, 
in increasing local independence as a result of mesures for deconcentrating' 
the competences. In large areas, the elaboration of the organizational and. 
functional rules („Status rules") of the administrat ive s ta te organs has been. 
3 The latest way of approaching democracy is demonstrated by a lot of measures; 
after the party decision in 1953. As a consequence of that, in the legal literature,, 
as well, there has again been increased the interest in fighting the bureaucratic: 
manifestations and eliminating them. From the papers published in 1954 cf. the-
following ones: István Pozsonyi: Causes of bureaucracy appearing in the council, 
apparatus and the fight against them. (State and Administration, Vol. 1954, Nos.. 
6—7, pp. 271 et sq. Hungarian); Miklós Révai:" Some methodical questions of the-
fight against bureaucracy. (State and Administration, Vol. 1954, No. 12, pp. 648. et: 
sq. Hungarian). 
4 The contemporary tasks of the fight against bureaucracy were elaborated,, . 
opening new vistas, by István Kovács and Imre Markója, in their paper, Against 
bureaucracy — for improving the work of administration. (Social Review, Vol. 1956., 
No. Sept. pp. . . . et. sq Hungarian). 
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comple ted , an Act concerning the procedure of state administration h a s been 
created, the public management has become standardized more and more. 
Staff decreases in the administrative apparatus, etc. h a v e been ca r r i ed ou t 
by our Government of more occasions. 
The claim to improve the sate machanism has become a fact beyond argu-
ment, nevertheless, the public opinion, the state work, the political sciences 
have met other phenomena of bureaucracy, different ones from those men-
tioned above; and not in a low degree, either. On the basis of these experien-
ces some common belief has gained ground about bureaucracy being a hydra 
of a thousand heads: being cut one of its heads immediately another one 
grows instead of it. Our daily press often unmasks bureaucratic procedures 
that poison the life of people — sometimes, perhaps, in cases appearing in-
significant — but anyhow cut to the quick. Seeing these phenomena, some 
are looking at the fight againts bureaucracy wiht some pessimism, being in-
clined to accept a standpoint according to which it is something joint neces-
sarily with life, against which we are in vain trying fighting. 
Some are comparing bureaucracy with a cancerous disease of organism. 
We are knowing a lot about it, immense exprimental material is collected 
about different methods of its development, about some forms of appearence 
of its devastations, and even — if revealed in due time — about the highly 
probable expectation of the positive effects of some fast procedures which are 
to be applied, etc. The cancer is, however, not yet cleared up in respect of its 
basic causes, the most different variations of its development, the therapeu-
tic procedures, methods show up no definitely positive results, either. Is it 
right to draw a parallel between bureaucracy and this disease that keeps 
on being, in some degree, still so mysterious? As it- is said, eve ry compar i son 
is containing something which does not suit the related other case at compa-
ring them. But not speaking about that, it is still doubtful whether or not 
it is useful to make a comparison the final consequence of which concerning 
bureaucracy is that we do't know exactly either its causes or a sure thera-
peutic method for its healing, and shall possibly never be able to over-
come it. 
We have, of course, no cause to be so pessimistic; b u t i t c a n n o t be said, 
either, that the social sciences gave a definite ¡and complete answer to the 
questions: what are the exact causes of bureaucracy, what is the direction 
of their future influence and, first of all, whether or not their pernicious 
effect can be prevented putting an end to bureaucracy at some time in the 
future. 
The socialist political sciences, the science of organization and sociology 
keep examining these problems deeper and deeper, having explanations more 
and more exact concerning the causes that elicit bureaucracy and looking for 
ways of preventing, resp. terminating these pernicious tendencies. The science 
provided whit the arms of Marxismus-Leninismus is — in our opinion — abso-
lutely suitable to support the state organizing work effectively in its 
struggle against bureaucratical manifestations. They will soon discover the 
complex motives, indispensable for fighting definitely down bureaucracy as 
a constitutional disease. In the following we are trying to review the stand-
points elaborated in the social sciences and in the science of organization con-
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ce rn ing some bas ic p rob lems of bu reauc racy , to t a k e u p a posi t ion in r e spec t 
of t h e m and , f i r s t of all, to d e t e r m i n e t he p r e sen t con ten t of b u r e a u c r a c y . 5 
2. T h e express ion „ b u r e a u c r a c y " ha s seve ra l i n t e rp r e t a t i ons . In t h e every-
day u s e of w o r d — i. e., as public opinion i t uses — a n y m i s t a k e s t a k i n g 
place, occu r r ing in t he l i fe of o rgan iza t ions a r e b r a n d e d as b u r e a u c r a c y . 
T h e n b u r e a u c r a c y is a collective term occur ing in e v e r y m a n i f e s t a t i o n of 
t h e o rgan iza t iona l f u n c t i o n if f u n c t i o n s a n d decisions of t h e o rgan do n o t 
m e e t t h e (o f ten subjec t ive) r e q u i r e m e n t s set u p b y t h e cit izen to t h e o rgans . 
T h e t e r m b u r e a u c r a c y m a y be appl ied in m o r e m e a n i n g s by t h e social 
sciences, as well .0 Even a b r o a d e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of sciences has, h o w e v e r , 
a m u c h n a r r o w e r con ten t t h a n t h e e v e r y d a y use of t e r m . 
a) T h e c o n t e n t of t h e t e r m b u r e a u c r a c y m a y be obse rved in t h e m o s t 
consequen t a n d u n a m b i g u o u s usage in connec t ion w i t h t h e administrative 
apparatus that is sharply separeted from the society of bourgeois state. B u -
r e a u c r a c y is, in th i s sense, a n organ-type of the bourgeois state, c o n t a i n i n g 
necessary b u t also pathological e lements , as wel l . T h e capi ta l is t ic S t a t e c a n -
no t ex is t w i t h o u t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; t h a t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n mus t , h o w e v e r , b e 
ant isocial , because of i ts cons t i tu t iona l o rgan iza t ion a n d f u n c t i o n a l p u r p o -
ses. T h e r e f o r e b u r e a u c r a c y m u s t be consequen t ly e l imina ted in t h e cou r se 
of t h e cons t ruc t ion of t h e socialist S ta te , in its s t r u c t u r e deve loped u n d e r 
t h e condi t ions of t h e bourgeois S ta te . 
T h e d i f f i cu l t l y of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e t e r m b u r e a u c r a c y a p p e a r s in c o n -
nect ion w i t h t h e socialist mechan i sm. 7 Sciences t o -day h a v e a l r eady got ove r 
5 I want to refer relatively at length to the various conceptions made about. 
bureaucracy by the modern bourgeois sociology and science of organization, as well. 
In the course of that I must use some phrases, technical terms, too, that are still 
sounding strange in the socialist political sciences here and there. Owing to the 
more' and more frequent sociological studies, however, they are more and more 
used, too, although it is no definite decision, as yet, concerning their critical 
evaluation, the mutual comparison of the contents of socialist and bourgeois so-
ciological expressions, and — their critical evaluation towards the bourgeois science. 
In this domain, we may accept for a starting-point the book of András Hegedűs, 
The modern bourgeois sociology and social reality. (Budapest, 1961. Hungarian). 
6 It has already appeared above that we have considered bureaucracy some 
organizational and functional deficiency of the organisms. The entire Marxist lite-
rature is unitary in using bureaucracy only in a pejorative sense. The bourgeois 
sociological and legal literature, on the other hand, is regarding bureaucracy not 
only as a necessary institution, having consequently also some positive functions, 
but — on the basis of Max Weber's conception — a lot authors consider it an ideal 
organizational form.Cf. Max Weber, The essentials of bureaucratic Organization: an 
ideal-type construction. Reader in Bureaucracy. Ed.: R. K. Merton — A. P. Gray — 
B. Hockey — H. C. Selvin. Illinois, 1960, p. 18.: op. cit., further: Kálmán Kulcsár: 
Max Weber and the political sociology. (State, and Legal Science. Ed. Academy. 
Budapest, 1963, Mo. 4, p. 460. Hungarian). 
7 In the socialist literature, one wants to separate the content of the word 
„bureaucracy", sharply or hesitating, from the practice of bureaucracy. E. g., Lajos 
Szamel is differentiating as follows: „Bureaucracy as content is an official staff 
with privileges; bureaucracy as practice, however, is a method of working." (Lajos 
Szamel: Fundamental legal problems of the leadership of administration. Budapest, 
1963, p. 109, Hungarian). Even after ceasing of bureaucracy, bureaucracy as a 
method of working does not cease necessarily. Thus in our people's democracy, took, 
after bureaucracy had been eliminated, „the bureaucratical outlook and the methods 
of working deriving from it have survived and are still living, upholding some of 
their old formations and getting new ones, as well — although in a more and more 
decreasing degree". In his opinion, „for overcoming bureaucracy, socialist conscience 
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denying the possibility or fact of the development of bureaucratic tenden-
cies in the socialist administrative organization. What can, however, be called 
bureaucratic with us? The political sciences are giving two kinds of ans-
wers to that question; one of them may be called a wide scientific inter-
pretation of bureaucracy, the other a narrow interpretation. 
b) In the legal literature all the inadequacies of the functioning of orga-
nism are considered bureaucracy, having taken their origin during the acti-
vity of organism from an organizational insufficiency, from bad organizatio-
nal solutions. The functioning of an administrative organ may be bureauc-
ratic in a broad sence if a mistake occurs that could have been avoided 
with an adequate organizational work, in a given sector of the organization. 
(If the compentances are arranged, the procedure necessary to the decision 
formed, the members of the. apparatus educated professionally-politically, 
etc.). It can be understood, therefore, that bureaucracy can always be ava-
luated in comparison with time, place, and given conditions, and that the : 
main from of its. appearance in the different periods of the people's democ-
ratic state construction is differring, as well. It could be called a bureauc-
ratic mistake if an organ did not take part in its domain with proper in-
tensity in the class-warfare (not fighting effeciently enough for crushing the 
old machinery), and it was, the same, a bureaucratic failure when the func-
tioning of organs with a maximal effeciency has been checked by chaotic 
competences, unelucidated constutional connections, lack of procedural rules. 
A wide interpretation of bureaucracy is, as seen, a relative notion, the mea-
sure of the negative character can scarcely be established definitely, depen-
ding greatly upon what we are considering the most important link of 
chains „next in turn" in the . course of the continuous improvement of the 
organism. This bureaucracy in a broader sense can, in fact, have as a cause 
every mistake or the lack of any natural endowment exerting, in a given 
period, the insufficiency of the organic functioning, resp. producing grotes-
que results. 
c) In our days, the political sciences have got to the elaboration of a nar-
rower content of bureaucracy which can be determined much more exactly 
than as far. It is, of course, no mere chance that to-day we can already give 
a more recent notional definition of bureaucracy. Our constitutional deve-
lopment has namely got in our days to the phase where the peculiar form 
of bureaucracy, that can be separated more from other constitutional mis-
tankes, like a kind of danger, obtains more and more actuality. Bureaucracy, 
.as a „pure" pathological phenomenon, is showing its true face in this phase 
of building up Socialism where the organizations are regulated on a definite 
must be raised upon a high level." (Óp. cit. p. 110). This delimitation — in another 
form — can be found at. János Beér, too. He is declaring, with reference to Lenin, 
that „bureaucracy is built up on a separate layer of officials in privileged position." 
(Administrative. Law, I. General part. Ed,: Beér—Mártonffy. Budapest, 1959, p. 324, 
Hungarian). 
On the other hand, „the essence" of the rule of bureaucracy is „being detached 
from life, carrying out the tasks but mechanically, an administration becoming 
self-contained, a self-imposed seclusion behind the desks, often escaping from res-
ponsibility.". (Op. cit., p. 326). All these may be named some methods of working, 
too, as spoken about by Szamel. 
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high level or, calling it in another way, where the formalization is in an 
advanced stage. 
Bureaucracy is an organizational deformation brought about on deve-
loped levels of the formalization of an organism performing the function 
of execution. The formalization, that means the conditions of the appearance 
of bu reauc racy , appears at an overregulated orgnizational structure and func-
tion. (Lack of proportion). The administrative organization (is attaining the 
level of formalization where the bureaucratic dangers in particular sense 
appear if 1. the external framework of the organizational structure of per-
forming the tasks is more and more established by norms and the division 
of labour inside the organization is fixed in status rules, even in its details; 
2. some phases of the functioning of the organ are made stiff by the order 
of functioning elaborated for the organs in the frames of the status rules 
and the ways of administration are bound more and more tightly by general 
and particular rules of procedure, 3. the decisions inside the organization 
ore made according to programmes of high degree. The programmes endea-
vour to paraphrase the functions of organs participating in the preparation 
of decisions, as well the obligations of the single organs in the preparatory 
work, and the liability for the decision on the basis of the formal and infor-
mal participation 4. in the formal organization the specialists on different 
stages of the organizational system get into a rigid hierarchy on the basis 
of t h e legal o rganiza t ion , wh i l e having some common particular interests, 
as well. 
Bureaucracy may appear in any structural element of the organization 
rising on a higher level of formalization. The main forms of the manifesta-
tion of bureaucracy are: a claim to the. quantitative development of the 
organization, t h e f a i l u r e s of t he norms of procedure, of the blueprinted deci-
sion arisen by structural causes, and the formation of a habit of own white-
collar workers. 
Apart f rom the pattern of structural forms, bureaucracy is influenced by 
the size of organization, too, as well by complexity of the tasks standing 
before the organization. The larger the organ system is and the more comp-
licated tasks an organ has to solve, the greater is the danger of bureauc-
ratic mistakes in the structural pattern. Anyhow, the basic factor in respect 
of b u r e a u c r a c y is level and method of the regulated structure because i t 
depends finally upon this factor whether or not the bureaucratic distortions 
come about. 
It follows from the above-mentioned facts that not every organizational 
deficiency may be called bureaucratical in the former — narrower — sense 
of the word. E. g., it cannot be attributed to bureaucracy if the administra-
tive organ of jurisdiction, from want of expert knowledge, is interpreting 
a legal norm erroneously, incorrectly and makes a false decision. A mis-
take like this, originating from subjective causes, is not at all a problem 
connected with being highly regulated, the formalisation of the mechanism 
has namely just the consequence that the members of organization have 
an expert knowledge as deep as possible. The peculiar bureaucratic distortion 
begins only if an incorrect decision comes about even in case of a due 
expert knowledge, of an endeavour to respect the legal norms. 
There are — .or more exactly only there were — a number of other 
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deficiencies of organizational construction and function the harmful conse-
quences of which were obvious without being able to be considered b u r e a u s 
ratic in a narrow sense. (It is another question that these are treated by 
the public opinion and often even by the legal literature indiscriminately 
•as especially bureaucratic distortions). The „infantile disorders" of „young" 
•organism were not real bureaucratic distortions. We cannot consider bureauc-
rat ic distortions. We cannot consider bureaucratic failures in a narrower sense 
even the deficiencies in the organizational life that are the consequences of 
¡being regulated not on a due level. E. g., the constitutional deformation, 
:i. e., a state where even the regulation that constitutes an organism is to 
tie found, as a rule, only in its principles. (There was a situation like that 
in connection with a lot of organs immediately after the Soviet revolution 
or, in this country, at the beginning of the Hungarian Soviet Republic). Also 
the failure may be classed here that comes about from the normative disor-
der of the. inner proportions of the organism. This has the consequence that 
the division of labour — and with it the expert administration — is getting 
on more slowly, „Everybody is making everything". If the competence of the 
organs isn't determined but in principle, it is much possibility .for disputes, 
the weight of labour is transferred to the organs of general competence, 
they being responsible for the final arrangement of every case sent f rom 
one organ of special administration to the other, as well, etc. 
The procedure of a „juvenile" administrative organism has hardly any 
norms. The course of administration is characterized by spontaneity; they 
develop at random, on a casual basis ever changing administrative proce-
dures. The procedure of deciding being unprogrammed, there prevails, within 
broad limits, a complete discretionalism and, jointly, a contradictory and 
conflicting practice. There are several drawbacks to all these in the func-
tioning of organs, and they are manifestations of negative contant similarly 
to the bureaucracy in narrow sense. Nonetheless, they are to be separated 
f rom that since their causes and the forms of their appearance are thoroughly 
different. The above-mentioned deficiencies are arising f rom the lack of the 
rationalization of organism; the bureacracy in a narrow sense, however, 
appears under conditions of highly regularized administrative processes. 
II. 
FACTORS ELICTING BUREAUCRATIC TENDENCIES 
The causes evoking bureaucratic tendencies are, even in a socialist so-
ciety, unquestionably in connection with some alienation existing under 
certain conditions. The alienation in the state organism is, of course, not 
identical simply with bureaucratization. Anyway, it is no mere chance that 
our literature of political theory is referring to the bureaucratic manifes-
tations as standing almost in the first place among the alienation phenomena 
of state organism. . . . 
An investigation of the general socio-economical causes of alienation 
cannot be our task. In the following we are, however, moving necessarily 
in the framework treated of by Marxist philosophy like causes of the appe-
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arance of alienation tendencies. We wish to concretize under which conditions, 
in fact, the development of the division of labour in a socialist constitutional 
system can become the originator of an organizational deformation. 
First of all we have to make it clear that in a socialist state mechanism 
the bureaucratic tendencies do not occur on the same level and in the same 
connection as under capitalistic conditions. I. e., in a bourgeois State certain 
types of organs ( the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e organiza t ion) are necessarily and unalte-
rably bureaucratic in some degree. In the socialist revolution it ceased to be 
possible f o r an o r g a n - t y p e to produce bureacracy as a whole and constantly 
(continuously), ripening almost a conviction that without a way of organi-
zation like that there is no modern organizational life. Among the socialist 
state organs, as well, the administrative organs are doubtless the most 
„inclined" to be distorted in bureaucratic direction. Nonetheless, it would be 
a grave error, to consider bureaucracy necessarily inseparable from the ad-
ministrative organization under socialist conditions. W e should e x a m i n e , a n y -
way, wich are the factors evoking arid harbouring bureaucratical tendencies 
since the beginnings of the socialist state organization — apart f rom the 
subjectivist mistakes in the state construction — and in our days, as well. 
Bureaucracy means generally an organizational separation where the 
possibility of a super-organic social control decreases- and possibly ceases to 
be. The independence of the bureaucratized organization is manifested f i rs t 
of all in the fact that the responsibility for functioning and decisions of t he 
organization cannot — or can but in a limited degree — be enforced. The legal 
guarantees may be degraded to be mere formalities in respect of clearing u p 
and applying responsibility. On the basis of a bureaucratic organizational 
„independence" the administrative organs get a possibility, even in case of t he 
exis t ing decisions produced on a representative bases, to f u n k c t i o n in a c c o r -
dance with their particular organizational interests. 
The organizational separation of administration is a necessary concomitant 
of the state organization of the exploiting society. The function of the organi-
zation that is serving for the expression of class rule evokes in itself a separa-
tive tendency! Yet bureaucracy becomes a special problem only in the phase 
of social development where the development of the forces of production 
needed a major division of labour in the organizational system. 
(1) The basic cause enabling the bureaucratic manifestations to prevail 
— and even to seem stronger here and there to some degree — under socialist, 
condi t ions , too, originates from living conditions more and more complicated. 
In the socialist society number (quantity), extension and character of the 
tasks demanding solution are rising on a higher and higher level. In the 
socialist mechanism — and inside it in the administrative organization — the 
solution of tasks more and more complex is of common occurrence. In the 
first phase of the people's democratic state construction we have carried out 
8 Cf.: Dr. Mihály Samu: Estrangement of State. (State and Administration. 1965, . 
No. 7, pp. 582 et sq., Hungarian; András Hegedűs: Optimalization and humanization. 
Truth, Vol. 1965, No. 3, p. 25, Hungarian). In the bourgeois literature an immense 
number of experiments have taken place for clearing up the connections between 
estrangement and bureaucratized situation. Among them we find a highly inte-
resting, even if not fully elaborated, train of thought on pages 19 et sq. of E. E. 
Jenning's book, An anatomy of leadership (New York, I960.). 
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a lot of organizatory work that — in certain sense — means a closing up on 
the line of organizatory technique. After a complete socialization of the 
instruments of production, however, the socialist States got some organizatory 
tasks that are much more complex than those of the administrative organs of 
the developed imperialistic States. To organize for instance the economical 
management on the basis of the collective propriety of all the instruments of 
production of basic importance is a much more complex task conglomerate 
thian that met by the economical management of imperialistic States where 
some experiments have taken place to introduce some elements of planning. 
There, namely, even the most rational influencing (control) is but a completion 
of the tendencies, determined in their bases by the value rules. 
Apart from the obvious complexity of the economical tasks, we could 
refer anyway to a long series of cultural, hygienic, stylistic, etc. problems 
demanding a solution from the socialist administration, as well. It is ascer-
tained by the everyday experiences in the socialist state construction that 
an efficient solution of a task is the function of other problems appearing in 
ten or a hundred other fields of administration. Under socialist conditions, 
t h e r e f o r e , the solution of tasks is depending upon the efficient collaboration 
of more and more factors. Concerning the solution of complex. tasks, the 
administrative organization does not rely on spontaneous signalling installa-
tions but it is planning and carrying out the organizatory processes preceding 
the realization intellectually thoroughly wellweighed and calculated. 
As the tasks are so complex, in the socialist society there has been formed 
an administrative mechanism that is capable of organizing the work rationally, 
on a much higher level than any of the former ones. An opportunity arises 
to perform a division of labour among the organs participanting in carrying 
out the tasks in a higher degree than ever before. The tasks being so complex, 
there develops necessarily a much more differentiated organ system than 
anywhere else, e. g., in some imperialistic States. The broader the division of 
labour is between the organs ,the more is depending the successful solution 
of complex tasks upon the harmonious collaboration of larger and. larger 
organ systems.9 
Bureaucracy is, therefore, a problem of consciousness not only in the 
sense that the ideological relics of the capitalistic state order are still having 
an influence at us on members of the official organization; bureaucracy is 
more and more a basic question of consciousness in respect of the problem: to 
what extent the organizer can take in the enormus connections, and do his ra- ' 
tional function — with the help of his natural endowments, special qualifica-
tion, and experiences. Bureaucracy is, in that relation, a consequence not so 
much of harmful ideological effects but that of a conscieus, constitutional and 
technical „insufficiency" or inadequacy. 
Besides the former factors, in the formation of bureaucratic tendencies 
also the accelerated presentation of the tasks demanding a solution has a 
considerable role, as well the need of a fast adaptability of programmes, 
blueprints, to the changing socio-economical conditions. As the modern life 
9 In respect of the administrative tasks becoming more and more complicated 
in our days and of an ever stronger division of labour, cf. the paper of János Beér, 
The most important factors influencing the level of the state work. (State and 
Administration, 1964, No. January, pp. 5 et sq., Hungarian). 
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conditions are developing, the content and administrative procedures of the 
public tasks to be realized must be amended, on several occasions, already in 
the course of the planning of execution, immediately, and reformed in comp-
liance with the changed new demands. Thei new results of science are making 
obsolete, from one day to the other, the documentations of the plan, elaborated 
in details a.t economical investment plans or in thoroughly different fields 
of administration, as well. The living conditions themselves changing extremely 
fast set, therefore, extraordinary tasks to the state organization in some pe-
riods, particularly to the administrative organization. Only the most versatile 
organism can comply with the requirements changing fast. The administration 
in modern times continually strives — partly for reasons beyond its control — 
against a „lack of time". This situation produces — as we shall see — the 
immediate conditions that lead to the formation of the different forms of the 
manifestation of bureaucracy. 
(2) The factors, however, whose influence is directed to a bureaucracy 
motivated by the development of the social conditions, harboured f rom ob-
jective side, may only elicit a real bureaucracy if they are immediately 
depending upon formal (o rgan iza t iona l - s t ruc tu ra l ) solutions. A quick c h a n g e 
of the living conditions is, therefore, eliciting bureaucratic manifestations if 
connected with certain peculiar organizational deficiencies. The causes im-
mediately evoking bureaucracy come from the organizational (formal) side. 
The occurrence or recurrence of bureaucratic mistakes may be promoted by-
cer ta in organizational solutions, structures, organizational conditions of func-
tionig. In the following we try to summerize shortly the formal conditions a t 
which — particularly in the present phase of our state construct ion— some 
form of bureaucracy may come aobut. 
Among the eleciting causes of the bureaucratic manifestations in a broader 
sense, the lack or disorder of the proportions of the organizational units for-
ming a basic condition of the efficient functioning, h a s a cons ide rab le ro le . 
Every organ type has a peculiar function in the entire mechanism. If the orga-
nizational composition, resp. the ratios of the functioning elements are modified 
so that one organizational f rom or the other — because of the predominance 
of another organizational form. — becomes incapable of performing its func-
tion or is limited in administering, it, then bureaucratic consequences come 
about. The troubles of proportion in cooperation of the units forming the 
organism can originate form an „organizational" failure of the institutional 
structure (because of being wrongly regulated legally) or from a wrong prac-
tice-that forces its way through an adequate legal rule. 
(a) The confusion between the peculiar functions of organs takes place 
first of all in administrative and representative relation, as well in the relation 
of representative and direct democratic forms. The administrative organs — 
as executive-operative organs — really often practice the basic function of 
representative organs like, for instance, deciding in an important question 
concerning the interests of some collective/ Even if the competence of represen-
tative organs is formally assured, the right proportion in the work of represen-
tative and administrative organs may be missing. Besides the legal possibility, 
other conditions are needed, too, that the representative organ can perform 
a meritorious work at making the decisions that are of basic importance in 
12 
respect of the function of the representative organ.10 One of these conditions 
is, e. g., that the members of the representative organ should have all the 
informations necessary for a multilateral examination of the problems the 
most important for the community. Mentioning the notions that are used in 
the sociology in lack of informations, as á consequence of the representative 
organs may be but formal. These public bodies, some times in consequence 
of the personal, subjective mistakes of their members, at. some other time 
because of some conditions not a,t all known or approved of by our govern-
ment, are not possessing the knowledge, data, indicators possessed by the 
executive organs; in such cases the proposition is determining, in fact, the 
decision, giving rise among members of the representative organs to a sus-
picion that their role is but formal. 
A similar contradiction may exist in our mechanism between the body 
representing the collective and the collectivity of the members of community.. 
Sometimes the representative organs do not take in consideration that, at the 
solution of the tasks, the hearing of the whole membership of the collectives 
may be useful in that respect, too, that they will take part in carrying out 
the made decisions with a much greater intensity if at the decision also their 
opinion was taken into consideration. In some basic decisions, therefore, the 
best method is to give to the entire community a hearing. A fundamental 
area of direct democracy is a community of minor strength in which the 
members may multilaterally exchange their opinions, express their possible 
anxiety in connection with the would-be decision. In the organizations where 
there is an opportunity to negotiate personally, immediately the basic prob-
lems (brigades, smaller villages, etc.) and where it is really done, the organic 
separation that, if consolidated, causes inevitable bureaucratic tendencies, is 
minimized.11 
The direct cooperation of the working people in the state affairs is re-
garded by the classics of Marxism as one of the most efficient measures of 
the defence against bureaucracy.12 Our socialist political sciences constantly 
emphasize that our work of state construction has realized important results 
particularly by drawing the working people into the concrete administration 
of the tasks. It is doubtless that direct democracy must be realized first of 
all in the field of the administrative work in the future, a,s well. In the pre-
sent phase, of our development, however, we must take into consideration that 
we have a lot of possibilities to draw the working people into the decisions, 
as well. That would have a very positive influence on.the fur ther development 
of activity, too, by carrying out the administrative tasks and on forcing back 
the bureaucratica] tendencies. 
(b) In the last decade of the people's democratic development of our State 
we did much for developing the right proportions between functions of the 
10 Fr<pm these conditions we don't mention those being functions of the method 
of construction and of the constructional pattern of the representative organization. 
About this problem cf. more fully: Ottó Bihari: Representative democracy. Social 
Review, 1965, Nos.-8—9, pp. 42 et sq., Hungarian).. 
11 About harmonizing the peculiar functions of the direct and representative 
democratic forms cf. András Hegedűs, Optimalization and humanizatiori. Truth, Vol. 
1965, No. 3, p. 29, Hungarian; István Szentpéteri: Present role of the direct democ-
ratic institutions. Social Review, 1965; No. 7, pp. 37 et sq., Hungarian). 
12 Cf.: Lenin, State and revolution. Lenin's Works, Vol. 25. Budapest, 1952, p. 
523. (Hungarian translation). 
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cent ra l and local organs. The h a r m f u l consequences of the exagerated centrali-
zation characterizing the initial period of our sicalist state construction have 
already been successfully eliminated in a considerable part. The local inde-
pendence, however, is still mortified here and there and, at the same time, 
there is a danger, too, that in cases where the point of view. of a unit of 
higher degree (or that of the collectivity) ought to prevail there are, never-
theless, local, localpatriotic considerations decisive. The guarantees of the 
•local independence may, therefore, be developed in a series of domains accor-
ding to t h e p r inc ip le t h a t the regional organs with the most perfect local 
experiences should decide in the affairs of not-general interest. The centrali-
zation is, however, factor restraining the evolution only in deciding fast and 
efficiently the so-called local questions. In other cases it is even a condition 
of the organizational consolidation that a parochial outlook, the local „par-
simony" should be eliminated thoroughly f rom the administration. 
(c) There are a lot of examples of harmful proportion changes in the or-
ganizational functioning in relations of the ramified and functional organs, as 
well.13 
There is a tendency of detrimental consequences, documented well in the 
history of the socialist state construction in the U. S. S. R., that appeared 
in t he non-coordinated functioning of the functional organs in a d e f i n i t e 
period.14 The harmonization of functions of organizatonal units functioning on 
the basis of line and functional principles is eliminating, resp. prevent ing a 
lot of anarchic disorganizing manifestations. It is the task of the science of 
"organization to establish exactly how the functional parts of the organs that 
increase, anyhow, the efficiency of their function may . be connected with the 
help of a control method able to accept the responsibility for the efficiency 
of the entire administrative activity. The troubles produced by the predomi-
nance of functionalism are often called, with good reason, bureaucratic mani-
festations as they not only prolong the period of accomplishment of some task 
of an organ but — nolens-volens — they diminish, by upsetting the propor-
tions, the efficiency, maximal productivity of the ramif ied and func t iona l 
organs. 
(d) T h e not satisfying relations between individual and corporative organs 
may also be classed among the disorder of the proportions between organs. 
I n . formal organisms the conditions of the participation in the procedure, 
construction and decision of the organs are laid down in norms. It is Question-
13 About the bureaucratic deficiencies produced in the state construction owing 
to the extreme centralism cf.: István Pozsonyi, Causes of bureaucracy appearing in 
the council apparatus and the fight against them. (State and Administration, Vol. 
1954, Nos, June-July, pp. Hungarian). About the bureaucratic consequences of 
overcentralization in Ferench economic relations cf.: G. Fülöp, Economic problems 
of the Ferench economic planning. (Truth, 1965, No. 6, p. 71, Hungarian). 
14 About the mistakes connected with a unilateral functionalism in an older 
phase of the Soviet state development cf.: G. I. Petrov, Soviet administrative law. 
Budapest, 1963, pp. 166 et sq., Hungarian; further the analysis of István Kovács, 
Foundations of the Soviet political and legal system. (Ed.: László Névai), University 
lecture notes. Budapest, 1959. pp. 98 et. sq., (Hungarian). 
In motivation of the present reorganization of the direction of Soviet industry 
they often refer to the fact that the functional organs (people's s economic councils) 
formed since 1957 have conduced, among others, also to. the bureaucratic mistakes 
of organization. 
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nable, however, whether or not we everywhere find the exact line diving 
the domains between functions and decisions of the corporative and individual 
organs in that manner that the least possibility remains for red-taping, kicking 
about a document, and administration of formal idling, etc. 
Some may consider it an exaggeration that we are classing the harmful 
consequences of displacemënt of the organic-systematic proportions among 
the causes eliciting bureaucracy. It is doubtless that the negative effects of 
t h e m do not always get to the surface like bureaucratic manifestations. Th is 
is the case in connection with almost every factor made known above as 
motives setting the development of bureaucracy on foot. At outlining the 
forms of the manifestation of bureaucracy we are, however, wishing to attest 
that in several cases they elicit a broadly interpreted bureaucratic tendency. 
(3) Among the causes of bureaucratical manifestations we have to mention 
t h e inadequacies of the legislating work, a n d m o r e near ly , those of the legal 
technique3 as well. It mould be, of course, a vulgarization to say that „bureauc-
racy is born" by the legal norms. Anyhow, the legal regulation is tending, : 
partly, unquestionably towards a stabilization, fixation of the existing admi-
nistrative relations. At elaborating the executing norms of the administrative 
t a sks the legal rules are establishing some patterns, as a metter of routine. 
The antinomies between the abstractions .of the legal rules and the effective 
formation of the legal rules that are to be arranged get to the surface, at the 
present accelerated pace of life, in a rather short time. Also the legislative 
work must face the problem that is so frequent at planning, technical dève-
lopment work, i. e., that the propositions become already out-of-date for the 
time when the plans axe made in their details. In our legislative work we 
endeavoured consistently in the last decade to arrange as exactly as possible 
the administrative relations, for eliminating any discretionary rule that makes 
possible the arbitrary actions. An inadequate legal regulation — that in its 
abstractions does not follow the variations and developmentary trends of the 
real relations — increases, of course, the bureaucratic tendencies. And it is 
still more dangerous if the legal sources that were originally good, are accep-
ting solutions becoming obsolete in consequence of the changing cónditons. 
Without revising continuously the enormous quantity of substantive and ad-
jective laws concerning the solution of the administrative tasks, arid without 
substituting new adequate norms for the out-of-date rules, the danger of 
bureaucracy doubtless increases. 
Among the factors causing bureucratic distortions, finally the role of 
subjective elements,. as well,. is to be mentioned. The connection between 
bureaucracy and the deficiencies of the professional and political qualifications 
of persons having a leading role in the control of the organizational structure 
is generally known. Education and afterschool instruction have therefore 
always been considered, rightly, a tool of the antibureaucratic fight.15 A con-
siderable contribution to a more exact examination of the subjective factors 
of bureaucracy may anyhow be yielded by personal psychology and social 
15 Cf.: Dr. Ferenc Dallos, The councils are the organs of the socialist democracy. 
Budapest, 1964., p.- 289, Hungarian; István Kovács—Imre Markója, The fight againts 
bureaucracy in the administration. (Social Riew, 1956, No. 9, pp. 28 et sq., Hun-
garian). 
psychology that have made already concrete steps towards revealing the 
character-criteria of individuals inclined to bureaucracy and, as well, toward 
trying to clear up existence and development of the motives of bureaucratic 
behaviour. 
m . 
FORMS OF APPEARANCE OF BUREAUCRACY 
(1) It is not a recent observation in the political sciences that, in the ad-
ministrative mechanism, stronger or weaker tendencies may gain ground for 
increasing in a continous and standing way their own organism. I t is e x t r e -
mely difficult to ascertain in which degree this endeavour expresses an objec-
tive need and where it passes the limit where we can already only speak about 
an over-developing of the organism by itself. It is generally known that, under 
modern social conditions, the administrative organism gets on with its standing 
growing in structure, in number of people in its staff. When can be said that 
the organism has hypertrophied the necessary size? 
The boundary between necessary and superfluous can generally be estab-
lished, in practice, only when in the organizational development, that initially 
was considered reasonable, later on negative consequences of the organizational 
overgrowth are calling our attention to some anomaly. In the beginning of the 
socialist revolutionary change, a t creation of a considerable part of the ad-
ministrative organizational mechanism which was necessary to carry out the 
highly multifold task-group waiting for realization, there was no objective 
possibility for a „measurement" preventing the constitutional elephantiasis. 
The overorganization was considered unavoidable by Lenin himself in the 
firts phase, of revolution,16 but nothing was fur ther from his thoughts than 
to consider it as a standing concomitant of the socialist organization. The const-
ructional overgrowth can be prevented in a definite phase of development, 
resp. the organization can be out back to the necessary size. 
This ensues when, after the political and economical consolidation- of the 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y resul ts , it becomes practicable to.plan the functioning of organs 
more exactly, to carry out investigations analysing carefully whether or not 
the tasks and the mechanism necessary for administering are „economical" 
ones. As simple as this thesis is in principle it is as difficult to carry it out in 
practice. To prevent the overgrowth of an organism, we need a science of 
organization with comparatively reliable measuring methods in respect of the 
efficiency of some procedures necessary to perform the tasks of our organs.17 
In the socialist States — in this country, too — there have taken place 
several experiments in the recent period to measure the administrative work. 
For ascertaining an overgrowth, there are interesting first of all the investi-
gations that want to reveal with exact methods the load of work and the work 
carried out effectively by the working people of some administrative organ-
16 Cf.: Lenin, About the work of the Soviet state apparatus. Budapest, 1956, p. 
79. (Hungarian transl.). 
17 Cf.: Dr. Ferenc Dallos, The councils are the organs of the socialist democracy 
Budapest, 1964, pp. 312 et sq., Hungarian; Janos Beer, The most important factors 
influencing the level of state work. (State and Administration, 1964, No. 1, p. 12, 
Hungarian). 
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parts. The investigations like these will doubtless contribute to establishe 
possibly the personal capacity, organizational size necessary for some elements 
of the administrative activity. Because of the high degree of complexity of 
the administrative tasks, however, there are some procedural processes, comp-
licated and hardly suitable for being typified, for the measurement of which 
the science of organization hasn't, as yet, any absolutely efficient methods. 
The direction of the formation and development of organizations in the most 
hierarchic organizations is demanding, therefore, practically — even besides 
the endeavours to take a previous measure of the organizational efficiency — 
f i r s t of all to apply the lessons of a number of empirical observations, to es-
tablish by estimation the capacity of the organ to be set up. etc. 
A body qualified for forming the organ (or a part of its) is standing before 
extraordinary difficulties if it has to decide about establishing some new organ 
or extending an old one. The organizational unit interested in the development 
of organs always emphasizes in the preparatory work the points of view 
stressing the importance, weight and significance of the organ to-be (or of its 
part to-be). The initiating administrative organism generally blueprints the 
would-bé apparatus upwards with a maximal loading. It reckons with every 
imaginable task of the organ at motivating the personal claims. It takes for a 
basis an ideal situation where the solution of tasks produces maximal results 
and the formal prescriptions (procedural rules) are carried out entirely, in their 
completeness. For supporting the personal, material, etc. demands of the organ 
to-be, they avail themselves of the frameworks given by the legal norms 
having erstwhile standardized to output norms on a level being rather low 
still — according to other conditions, etc. Apart from all these it is supposed 
that the different organs, as the experience shows, in the course of the revi-
sion of plans will anyway select the list of demands, therefore the proposer 
endeavours to raise more claims than needed objectively even for the maximal 
loading. 
The bourgeois science of organization has recognized some relations, of a 
growing tendency of mechanism but, as well-known, it could not impede the 
organizational overgrowth with objective measurements. In the directing 
mechanism of private economy a resistance against the creation of new organi-
zational elements is still relatively stronger because the capitalist is pondering 
every initiative strictly from the point of view of his immediate profit. In the 
monopolistic organizations, however, even the capitalists themselves cannot, 
realize the measure of efficiency of some would-be organ thus there exist 
more favourable conditions for the development of an economical bureucracy. 
In the sector of capitalistic State — capitalist, however, there are fewer and 
fewer factors turning against the demands of creating newer organizations. 
They consider therefore the organizational overgrowth to be more and more 
definitely objective that cannot be avoided.18 The Parkinson rule raises a 
„thesis" with witty irony for establishing the measures of growth, resembling 
18 About the investigations carried out concerning the measurement of work-
loading of some administrative organs cf.: Dr József Balázs—Dr. István Forgó— 
Ferenc Juhari, Measurement of the administrative work. (State and Administration, 
1965, No. 1, pp. 55 et sq., Hungarian) ; Dr József Kovacsics, Fact investigations 
concerning the analysis of the efficiency of administrative work at the Town 
Council in Székesfehérvár. (State and Administration, 1965, No. 2, pp. 122 et sq., 
No. 3., pp. 227 et sq., Hungarian). 
2 Szentpéteri István 17 
with not a little self-irony the science dealing with bureaucracy the English 
medical science in which if once a disease is recongnized, denominated, descri-
bed. and taken into consideration then the English are usualy satisfied and 
prepared to begin investigating the next problem raised. Are they asked about 
the way of therapy then they are surprized and propose to employ penicillin 
and, anyhow, before or af ter it, to extract all teeth of the patient.19 
Agains overgrowth of the organization under socialist conditions the most 
efficient help could be given to the organs, qualified for deciding, by a more 
developed science of organization. The socialist government organs f rom t h e 
beginning continue with observing anxiously the organizational demands of 
large size but they have, of course, in the interest of solving the new tasks 
getting constantly to the surface, to take fast and definited developing 
measu res . What may be the cause of being so extremely difficult to eliminate 
the exaggerating organizational claims? The tasks waiting for a solution by the 
administrative organs are often so unadapted for any programme that it is 
to-day impossible, as yet, to look, over, in an exact way, the procedural method 
of being optimally carried out. And the more unsuited for any programme the 
procedure of decision of the administrative organs is, the more uncontrollable 
is the reality of the claim elaborated by the initiators. At the formation of 
organs the capacity of the would-be organ cannot be planned exactly. The 
framework of the total capacity of an organ must be confirmed with such 
a „latitude" that it will in practice never make use of. This administrative 
organizational endeavour may rightly be compared with the outlook of engi-
neers at bridgebuilding,. planning, reasonably and correctly, with a „security"" 
of deflecting forces which the bridge built is never subjected to.20 From the 
pont of view of the capacity of a would-be new organ-system or organ-element, 
there arose also the question of personal composition of the organizational unit , 
t h e p rob lem, what kind of qualifications the persons should have, a n d w h e t h e r 
or not people of a qualification like that can be found. The personal capacity 
of the single members — either depending upon their qualification or leaving 
it out of consideration — is very different. At the formation of an organ the 
planning of manpower-utilization takes place either reckoning with a mean 
capacity or with an excellent dexterity of the attainable employees. I have 
picked out but a circumstance or two for demonstrating how difficult t he 
planning of the capacity and efficiency of a new organizational form is even 
if taking the ideal case that we are succeeding in outlining beforehand and 
exactly the course necessary for performing the task and in separating t h e 
different elements of its activity. (In reality, anyhow, this can be carried out 
but rather rarely, in case of simple enough tasks.) 
Despite of all these difficulties, the socialist state construction generally 
prevents the assertion of. exaggerated organizational demands at creating n e w 
organs, first of all by deciding these questions by high-level governmentary 
organs that are aware of the existing maximalist tendencies at organizations.. 
The over-organization is, as a rule, a concomittant of the later phase of t h e 
19 C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's law or the school of self-assertion. Bu-
dapest, 1964. (Hungarian translation). 
20 Cf.: R. K. Merton, The nature and sources of pathological bureaucratic-
behavoir. Ed. by R. Dubih, Human relations in administration. Englewood Cliffs„ 
N. J. II. Ind ed., 1962, p. 151. 
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development of an organization created for carrying out some task-group, as 
well. In the organizational work the deliberation by comparing the task and 
forces at our disposal is possible, in practice, really bu t in the phases of the 
creation or fu r the r personal enlargement of the organ. We consider typical 
t h e s t a t e of organizational overgrowth where the organization has f u l f i l l ed 
its function in some of its elements, partly solving the tasks it was obliged to 
perform. On governmental level it is extremely difficult to follow continuously 
with attantion how things stand objectively with the formation of task-groups, 
carrying out the purposes marked out being realized in some branch of 
administration. 
Also the exact establishment of the competence of administrative organs 
— whether it takes place at creating the organ-group or posterior to it, e. g., 
at the council organs of special administration, etc. — may contribute to the 
development of an organizational mentality that conduces to an organizational 
overgrowth. The arrangement of competences in the statutes of organization 
and functioning of the line administration and the personal division of the 
administrative tasks in the single institutions endeavour to establish exactly 
the rights and duties of the single employees. Having that arrangement, the 
special organs resist any classification of new tasks into their Competence that 
is not followed by a staff increase by the higher organs. The special organs 
of administration argue with taking into consideration in the rules , of status 
essentially the maximal capacity of the organ and having, beyond that, no 
„free capacity". They refer, as well, to all the circumstances in connection with 
which the higher organs rejected their claims for a development that they 
considered reasonable, producing by this decision itself a state of overloading. 
(The special organs would anyhow try, unnoticed, to augment continuously 
the administrative number of. personnel if not impeded by governmental 
rules).21 This argumentation of the organs of special administration may be 
accepted in some degree without, anyway, accepting it as a verification of a 
full utilization of the working capacity of organization. The higher special 
organs in some cases. — for one reason or another — cannot give satisfaction 
to the reasonable claims to development, either resp. they cannot carry out a 
reasonable increase of numbers in the organization even parallelly with getting 
21 A guarantee of that is that, in socialist countries, the' creation of new organi-
. zations is decided of generally on governmental level, similarly to the possible staff 
increase in the existing administrative organs. The careful control of the existing 
administrative organs. The careful control of the initiations that contain, as a rule, 
too great demands, is carried out by an office functioning beside the government 
and presenting suggestions to it. The prevention of an unjustified staff increase 
of the existing apparatus has been the purpose of measures in the S. S. S. R. 
according to wich the staff-contingent and wage fund must be registered, in the 
confirmed framework, at the competent financial organs. (Cf.: G. I. Petrov, Soviet 
administrative law. Budapest, 1963, pp. 169 et sq. Hungarian transl.). The practice 
of establishing the staff norms for preventing an organizational overgrowth has, .so 
far, fallen short of its original purpose. .Rightly is missing J. A. Tichomirov the 
lack of clearing some scientific measurements, some notional elements in the old 
practice; „there are not ascertained, as yet, the criteria of determining in the 
branches of the people's economy and culture the relation between the administra-
tive staff and the productive personnel. In that relation, mainly the budget-financial 
method is prevailing.. ." J. A. Tichomirov, The seasonable organizational and legal 
problems of the administrative work. A Collection of Foreign Law Monographs. 
1965., No. 3., p. 441., (Hungarian). 
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new tasks. Also that contributes to the causes of the state of organizational 
overgrowth, m a n i f e s t e d pa r t i cu l a r l y in the inclination of the organism to 
reserve some capacity. I. e., the administration „is hiding f rom the view" into 
other „transitory" parts its members whose tasks have already ceased even 
formally to exist. (And in the administration the circle of tasks no more 
carried out really but not terminated as yet by legal rules, is still much larger). 
The continuous preservation of the right proportions between the task 
waiting for a real solution and the personal capacity and material force con-
centrated in the organization is therefore an extremely difficult problem at 
the organs qualified for carrying out continuos and casual tasks. An organi-
zation of bureaucratic inclination is endeavouring to maintain the personal 
staff of organism, even if the major part of the functions in its competence 
anyway ceased to exist. Even if it is constrained to cut down its functions, 
it does everything for placing the persons employed in the administrative 
organization at other organparts. At an organizational behaviour like that, 
the liquidation of some organpart often doesn't mean a simplification of the 
organization but only a reorganization where the administrative staff number 
remains unchanged. And the harmful consequences of the administrative 
„hydrocephaly"* appear in the procedure, in the well-know evil that an organ 
like that wants to produce, at any price, on appearance of work. 
The governmental organs apply, for liquidating the bureaucratic over-
growth, the weapon of a general reduction of personnel. In these cases, within 
the frames determined by the central organs, it is compulsory to dismiss a 
certain number of persons f rom the administration. This way of rationalization 
leaves it finally — within the given frames and with some directives — to 
the discretion of the leaders of the local administrative organs to dismiss the 
persons they want to. It depends upon them that the staff cut touches really 
those persons whose functional-political incompetence caused the most com-
plaints. The general staff cuts —apart from creating situations that may be 
also subjectively highly unpleasant —: give reason to complaints in the appa-
ratus because they don't induce necessarily a simplification of the working 
process and, in consequence of that, the burdens of work of the single civil ser-
vants — although only temporarily, as experienced — do increase. The general. 
staff cuts like these.— in spite of every difficulty and problem joint with them 
— may be indispensable in case of an overgrowth of the organization, However, 
we may hope with good reason that, as the science of organizaton develops 
more and more, the state organization obtains methods making unnecessary 
these general staff cuts connected with lots of shocks and commotions. 
In regard of the prevention of the organizational overgrowth, resp. the 
amputation of the administrative „hydrocephalic overgrowth" already pro-
duced, it will be highly important to measure in come objective way the work 
load in each of the administrative branches. Even if it is very difficult to 
obtain measurement results giving real pictures in case of a series of tasks, we 
must not be unwilling, to make these experiments. In some branches and in 
some working processes the measurements have produced some part-results 
even in the past, and we may expect to get sooner or later, improving our 
measuring methods, some results, expressing more exactly than any of the 
former ones the optimal size wich can produce, with a given investment, the 
best administrative results. 
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• In the. elimination of the overgrowth the machines applied in the admi-
nistration may have a great role. We shall take into account not only the 
mechanization of the simplest work elements (e. g., registrations) but the 
machine may be „consulted" even at complicated non-programmed decisions, 
saving thus possibly a considérable „capacity" of persons.22 Apart from the 
scientific results mentioned and found wanting above, only a few major factors 
are to be taken into consideration. In previnting the organizatioal over growth 
the well-functioning representative organs and generally the social forces 
have a not negligible role. They may play but a role of brake, of resistance 
against the tendencies striving, as a rule, for growing the organizations but as 
long as we cannot elaborate more exact scientific methods this limiting 
function cannot be dispensed with. 
Another important measure against the bureaucratic growth of organi-
zations is a continuous amendment of the organizational systems for being 
internally more .and more organized. In some cases that can be expressed in 
a déconcentration of the . organization. The overcentralization that may by 
observed in the large organisms is not characterized by a strong, f irm central 
direction but by assuming a lot of local tasks by the main organs, hoping 
only thus an efficient performance of these tasks under the given conditions. 
An overcentralization like this considers to be a smaller mistake if the local 
parts aren't completely utilized or they are utilized but formally because of 
producing a not appropriate work. Sooner or later we must, however, inevi-
tably take up the question of the division of the organizational function at 
which the leader of the-local part may measure with full responsibility and 
real independence the use of the personal and material capacity at his dis-
posal that assures the maximal efficiency of that capaity. This may, of course, 
not happen to the detriment of the central direction and even this makes 
possible a continuous raising of the level of the local organization by central 
guiding rules, using really scientific results. 
In eliminating the tendencies that have an influence towards the over-
growth of the organization the status rules of the branch have some role, 
i. e., t h e norms determining the internal order of functioning of t h e s ingle 
institutions; these eliminate the antinomies between the actual manpower 
redundancy of the administrative organization and the requirements. Anyhow, 
these are mostly the harmful remainder's of the earlier unorganized states. In 
this way we can, namely, bring about a basis for a real comparison between 
the work load, actual capacity and the proper output o f ' t he working people 
of some territorial organs within the same administrative branch. 
2. The other form-group of the appearance of bureaucracy may be con-
sidered procedural of functional mistakes of the administrative organs. The 
22 The problem of mechanization of the administrative organization is surpassing 
far the limits of our problems. For preventing the overgrowth of the organization, 
the possibilities of which are not cleared up at us, we have to reckon with the 
new „simulating", etc.. possibilities of machine calculation that can be applied in 
decisions of great complexity at other places — in the economic control, military 
decisions. About that problem cf.: Sándor Szalai, Traditional and modern procedures 
in the organization of administration. Multiplied material of the Committe of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences for the Science of Organization. An up-to-date 
scientific foundation of leadership and administration and the practice of the 
education of leaders. Compiled by Ferenc Erdei. Budapest, 1964, pp. 70 et sq., 
(Hungarian). 
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bureaucratic tendencies appearing in the form of procedural failures are mani-
fested in different ways in the phases of the people's democratic state deve-
lopment.23 In the period immediately following the socialist revolution the 
procedural forms were missing and the single phases of administration were 
unarranged by legal rules at solving the tasks of different character. With the 
expression of the science of organization, the solution of tasks has mostly 
taken place in the framework of an unprogrammed procedure.24 It is also be 
taken into consideration as an antecedent that the competences have been 
rather unelucidated, the performance of any case could be postponed inde-
finitely both with exceptions to competence and with those to jurisdiction. 
And the procedures without programmes had the meaning that in accordance 
with the character of the extremely manifold new tasks there were no rules 
containing differentiated procedural processes exactly laying down the single 
phases of administration. This had some traditional, causes, too, and on the 
other hand, it could be explained also by the peculiarities of the given phase 
of the revolutionary development. A regulation of the administrative pro-
cedure (i. e., its being programmed generally) was missing in Hungary before. 
Liberation, and even in the more developed capitalistic countries its organi-
zation took place but in a few places.25 The continuous, enormous changes 
following the year of change in the legal system have not made possible to 
begin this work. In the unprogrammed procedure, it was essentially * trusted 
to the socialist legal conscience of the administrator what kind of infor-
mations he takes out in connection with the undecided problem, how many 
propositions he elaborates in his representations, whose opinion the deciding 
organ listens to and what points of view are prevailing at his making the 
decision, and how to control the execution of the content of decision. In the 
initial phase of the socialist state development, the bureaucratic procedural 
failure of „passing the buck to another department" took, therefore, its origin 
in the lack of procedural rules or regulations. . 
These being the conditions of procedure, the administrator has examined 
every single case individually seeing in it a problem differring from every 
other problem. They could, of course, not overcome the feeling concering the 
concrete tasks increasing more and more in number that the organization 
with its determined personal capacity cannot cope with these incresing new 
tasks. The period of the unprogrammed administrative procedures has deve-
23 About the appearance of procedural mistakes in the bourgeois state organi-
zation cf.: M. Rice Sharp, Procedural Vices: La Paperasserie. R. K. Merton — A. 
P. Garay — B. Hockey — H. C. Selvin, Reader in bureaucracy. Illinois, 1960, pp. 
408 et sq. 
24 About programmed and non-programmed procedures of decision cf.: Sándor 
Szalai: Programmed and non-programmed decisions. Multiplied edition of the 
Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for the Science of Organization. 
An up-to-date scientific foundation of leadership and administration and the prac-
tice of the education of leaders. Compiled by Ferenc Erdei. Budapest, 1964, pp. 63 et 
sq. (Hungarian), Further on cf. „The theory of administrative decisions". J. A. 
Tichomirov, The seasonable organizational and, legal problems of the administrative 
work. A Collection of Foreign Law Monographs. 1965, No. 3, pp. 446 et sq. (Hun-, 
garian transl.). 
25 The codification of the administrative procedure has been motivated in the 
capitalistic States, as well, first of all from the point of view of decreasing bureauc-. 
racy. Cf.: The administrative procedure. Monograph and notes written by Ferenc 
Toldi. Budapest, 1957, p. 7. (Hungarian). 
22 
loped, therefore, a claim in the apparatus that the new tasks can be satisfied 
only by enlarging the organization. 
Since 1957. we have taken long steps forward in the organizational ad-
ministrative work in fixing the competences of the administrative organs 
with exact legal rules and, as well, in arranging the functional procedures. 
The so-called status-rules, giving a taxative enumeration of the tasks expec-
ted to be realized by some line administrative organ, have been elaborated 
and confirmed in different instances of the administrative organs. In 1957 a 
law was enacted about administrative procedure generally arranging, apart 
f rom some special administrative branches, the procedural processes. The 
procedural processes have been made programmed in a m o r e and m o r e c o m p -
lete degree by several other legal rules, as well. 
In some elements of the administrative procedure, however, the still 
existing lack of being programmed, or some programmes carried out wrongly, 
m a y conduce us to bureaucratic mistakes. In t h e course of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
— apart from the entirely simple administrative tasks — the administrative 
elements contained generally in every organizational process may be limited. 
Even if there are still some debates concerning the exact number and content 
of these phases of leading, the opinion distinguishing four such elements of 
leading is more and more accepted; these are information, analysis (proposal), 
decision and control. The programming of the administrative work tries to 
circumscribe more or less tightly or loosely what the administrative organs 
have to do in the different cases in the single phases. The mistakes of pro-
cedure of functioning can occur in any functioning phase, 
. Among, the procedural and functional mistakes the innumerable sorts of 
assemblings of data, registers and reports, d e m a n d e d b y t he h ighe r o rgans 
sub titulo information, have a great „tradition". It is doubtless that a basic 
condition of the right decisions is to get the informative material necessary 
for a multilateral elaboration of projects. The different administrative organs, 
however, have sent (and even do send at present, too) directions without 
mature consideration, a great quantity of questionaries to the subordinate 
organs. These quickly made informations could practically scarcely be used, 
similarly to some groups of the official statistical informations (although just 
this fact was one of the reasons of the extraordinary informations). The 
Central Bureau of Statistics repeatedly endeavoured to eliminate the so-
called „black statistics", this problem has remained (even if not so gravely as 
in the past) unsolved even to-day. On' the lower level of administration people 
are often complaining rightly about the exaggeration of compulsory infor-
mations. That complaint is reasonable- first of all, if they are demanded to 
furnish, besides the confirmed obligation of giving informations, data that 
are available for the demanding organ in other registrations (records, dossiers), 
as well: On the other hand, the leaders often need more recent particular 
supplementary data, apart from the ordinary informations, before making 
more complicated, complex decisions. 
In case of a considerable part of tasks, the programmed administration 
has made much easier the situation of administrator. The executing admi-
nistrative organ conduces the affair through phases determined exactly on 
the basis of the programmed procedural rules exercising a definite function 
in the complex of administration. In a considerable — but in its character 
rather simple — group of administrative tasks the course of administration 
has become immensely easier, the typizaiion fixed in legal norms coming into 
prominence instead of the individualization of affairs. 
With the programmed procedure the other forms of the bureaucratic 
procedural mistakes have come into the limelight. The routine-like practie 
of the administrative organ that has developed on the basis of procedural 
rules predisposes the executive organ to class the given affair schematically 
into some category created by a legal rule even if that procedural method 
is not the most suitable for administrating it. In the present phase of our 
socialist state construction just this routine-like administrative procedure of 
the organs means one of the main dangers from the point of view of a 
functional bureaucracy. In the execution there may develop a feeling that 
it is responsible not for deciding an affair on its merits, with maximal 
efficiency, but only respecting some procedural formalism. A decision made 
in a formally adequate procedure is making it, according to its impression, 
irresponsible even if it does not meet in every way the general human points 
of view. At the simple administrative tasks, it is true, there is no particular 
problem, all the more it may be dangerous to have a routine-like procedure 
in the deciding processes of higher degree that are trying to harmonize many 
kinds of regards, as well in cases touching the major interests of citizens. 
Much as they have endeavoured to regulate with prevision and in details 
the procedural and administrative methods, it has been impossible to normate 
them concerning every complex administrative task. The state control of na-
tional economy — particularly its planning — as well the general administra-
tive work want a lot of highly important and basic decisions made which 
could not be programmed, so far. In the field of performing the tasks of 
extreme complexity there are still prevailing the same harmful tendencies as 
those mentioned generally in connection with the programming procedure 
that was missing in the first phase of the socialist state construction. A deci-
sion about, the program of our largest industrial investments and the deter-
mination of the purposes of a more developed agricultural production sup-
pose in their complexity a knowledge of interconnections of the proportions 
of the reciprocal effects of several different factors not easy to survey. The 
tasks of particular complexity like these are so much individual ones that , 
as a rule, they cannot be programmed according to our present knowledge. 
On the other hand, in an administration carried out with an unprog-
rammed procedure, there are several opportunities for protracting the admi-
nistrative course, inserting superfluous, practically repeated (i. e. uselles) 
opportunities to work. This bureaucratic procedural mistake does a particular 
damage first of all by wasting valuable — sometimes irreplaceable — time 
in the course of administration.27 At these task-groups to be realized, the 
26 Concerning that see: Tivadar Gál, Rationalization of the administration. 
(State and Administration, 1950, No. June—July, pp. 429—430, Hungarian), József 
Kovacsics, Bureaucracy in the work of the administrative statistics. (State and 
Administration, 1951, Nr. March—April, pp. 217 et sq. Hungarian). 
27 In important affairs difficult to survey the loss of time, that is a consequence 
of the non-programmed or badly-programmed procudere, is extremely harmful, 
but the most deterrent is the surplus of time and work caused by it before making 
even relatively simple decisions. J. A. Tychomirov rightly calls the attention to that 
unprogrammed procedurs of decision, resp. a „universal programme" taking 
the place of that is still making its harmful consequences feel in the ,,old" 
way. ,,A necessity of not-programmed decisions — as Sándor Szalai writes — 
arises in the most cases only in definite points of level of the adminis t ra t ive 
organization. It is to say, that in every other point or level, as an adequate 
programme is missing, immediately a »universal programme« prevails, saying: 
»It does not belong to our competence« or: »We are to refer the question to 
our superior authority«."28 In complex cases, the organ responsible for the 
decision o f t e n t r ies to divide the responsibility with other organs by asking for 
the expert opinion of as many organs as possible in t h e case. Accord ing to t he 
experience of the administrative organization, namely, the more organs have 
taken position about some task, the less the proportion of responsibility for 
the made concrete decision can be established. T h e o r g a n m a k i n g t h e f i na l 
decision can, namely, refer, at any occasion, to several other organs whose 
opinios proved to be defective or not fully satisfying in practice, and also 
the concerned institution can defend itself with several circumstances the 
objectivity of wich can hardly be established from outside. The more complex 
the tasks are the less can the decision be programmed and, accordingly, the 
more the deciding organ needs to perform a procedure on the basis, of wich 
it may throw the responsibility — at least subsequently — partly to other 
ones. After all, the delay of deciding at tasks of this character — often 
implying some major damages — can only be prevented by a standing raising 
of the professional and political preparness and disposing, at the same time, 
of a well-arranged institutional framework to furthering to them the scien-
tific results that are the most up-to-date in the given period.29 
In the modern science of organization there are to-day already made 
efforts to investigate the procedures and methods with the help of which 
it is possible to blueprint racionally the most complicated deciding opera-
tions.30 Also some results of the sciences of line organizations (organization 
of economy, etc.) may more and more contribute to the advancement of the 
general theory of organization in that domain. 
with these superfluous procedural phases the organ obliged by a legal rule to make 
a decision very often tries to cover itself for shifting the responsibility, at least 
partly to anybody else. Cf.: J. A. Tichomirov, The seasonable organizational and 
legal problems of the administrative work. A Collection of Foreign Law Monographs. 
1965, No. 3, p. 44,. (Hungarian, transl.) 
28 Sándor Szalai, Programmed and non-programmed decisions. Multiplied edi-
tion of the Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Science for the Science 
of Organization. An up-to-date scientific foundation of leadership and administra-
tion and the practice of the education of leaders. Compiled by Ferenc Erdei. Buda-
pest, 1964, p. 68. (Hungarian). 
29 A delay is often caused just by the differring scientific opinios. On the other 
hand, it is — under other , conditions — a problem of the organization of science, 
as well, how something „most up-to-date", that can be decided but difficultly, 
may get to the governmental and upper administrative organs. 
30 Although the formulae of the bourgeois science of organization cannot be . 
taken over, it may nevertheless be of inspiring effect if we study the enormous 
literary . material that is investigating the processes of an optimal decision. From 
the works dealing with this problem cf.: C. West Churchman, Prediction and 
Optimal Decision. London, 1961; J. G. March — H. W. Burck — B. Sapin, The 
decisions-making approach. Published in: H Eulaw — S. J. Eldérsveld — N. 
Jannowitz, Political behavior. Illinois. 2 nd ed., 1959, pp. 352 et sq. 
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In connection with the procedural mistakes we have to mention the 
harmful consequences of the deficiencies of legal organizations, too. It is 
verified both by organizational experiences and by scientific observations that 
an overprogrammed, over-regulated administration, as well, may result in 
harmful consequences. The hands of administrators are, namely, bound by 
these rules even in cases where an individual dexterity in initiation and 
inventiveness could find better possibilities than those proscribed by the over-
programmed procedures. The problem of the legal regulating technique is 
mostly whether or not the legislator can properly determine the procedure 
defining the powers and limits of a necessary programming and of the 
individual initiating ability of the executive persons. Anyway, the legal 
organ iza t ion can deform, with overremulation, the course of execution in a 
bureaucratic direction, by limiting the initiative of individual leaders, deve-
loping an 'inclination to contempt the contradictions of form and facts. In 
connection with the character of regulations, we have to mention the excep-
tions made to the general rules. An exception is, in fact,, a breaking through 
the programmed procedure by the legislator. The programmed procedure may, 
of course, not be. considered as an inviolable and sacrosanct dogma, and it 
would be a failure to decline to make a regulation that is reckoning with 
the peculiar situations and differring from, the general one. On the other 
hand, ja programming procedure creating several exceptions to the power 
of a general rule throws difficulties into the way of carrying out the legal 
rule and makes possible to protract the course of procedure. And another 
danger, too, may emerge as a consequence of an unsatisfactory legal regula-
tion. A legislator may have arranged a decisionmaking procedure on a too 
large scale, too, without performing the necessary generalizations. A regula-
tion like that, however, induces the organs of the national administrative 
execu t ion in t h e direction of an exaggerated individualization. 
It is obvious from all these that a procedural mistake may be very 
manifold and it appears in some definite phases of the historical formation 
of the development of States in different main forms. Here we are again 
facing the problem of proportions. The extremes (unprogrammed and comp-
letely programmed procedures) conduce, us, similarly, procedural mistakes, 
even if with different sings. The elimination of procedural mistakes, therefore, 
depends upon the combinations assuring the maximal efficiency in the course 
of procedure. 
3. The most dangerous form of appearance of bureaucracy is the deve-
lopment of a peculiar ,,red-tapism". Bureaucracy may congeal to be a system, 
may become characteristic of the style of leadership, may get to the surface 
in the whole habit of the civil servants and, obviously, in the single acts, as 
well, delivered in the course of functioning of the organization. Having 
investigated, bureaucracy above as an organizational overdevelopment and pro-
cedural mistake, we regarded it first of all as a distortion of one element 
of more of the organizatonal structure and function. Therefore, the delibera-
tion of proportions had always such a great significance. Bureaucracy is get-
ting its most devastating and most insurmountable shape after being con-
gealed to be a peculiar style of work. A procedural failure as. a casual bu-
reaucratic mistake may be made even by an organ functioning the most eff i-
c ien t ly ; if, however , t he leading style a n d t h e behaviour of the officials of 
an organization is generally taking bureaucratic features then that organiza-
tion becomes more and more estranged from human purposes, growing to get 
a power over the society. 
The question is whether we need to deal with this shape of bureauc-
racy. Whether or not in socialist relations, this extreme form of organizatio-
nal distortion may be produced at all? It is doubtless that the socialist me-
chanism has produced since the revolution a lot of measures that serve just 
for preventing bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is a concomitant of the bour-
geois administrative system, in its extreme shape it could develope under 
the conditions of the socio-political relations there. Some single elements 
of the bureaucratic red-tape habit may, anyhow, come about — although 
not generally — at us, too, under certain conditions. Just by calling the 
attention even to its milder forms already at the beginning of their forma-
tion, we can hinder them from getting even in single cases a more develo-
ped shape. Also we ought to take into account a possibility of distortions 
like thise because of the existence of some formal factors, structural pat-
terns which —• though our social system is basically resisting that bureauc-
racy — may have an influence in that direction, even besides the good poli-
tical content, if some subjective conditions are supporting them. It is parti-
culary actual to speak about all that in the present phase of our socialist 
state construction because the arangement of powers, the growing division 
of labour between the organs, and particularly the detailed legal regulation 
of the procedural relations may be a starting point in some extent — as 
discussed later on —• form some tendencies like these. Bureaucracy that 
appears here and there as a casual mistake may, namely, get repeated and, 
in this way, it can turn from a wron£ routine to an organizational working 
style. A description and characterization of different fully developed fea-
tures of the bureaucratic habit may, perhaps, be. helpful in eliminating even 
its manifestations being moderately- latent still in the bud. 
The bureaucratic institutional habit is often vividly characterized as an 
arteriosclerosis of the organization.31 They enumerate the basic symptoms of 
the senescence of the institution among the forms of manifestation of bu-
reaucracy.32 
These vivid expressions, themselves, are referring to the fact that for a 
tendency like this — besides the causes evoking the different forms of the 
bureaucratic manifestations — the interrelation between the „age" of organi-
zation and the peculiar social factors has, in fact, anyway a decisive impor-
tance. I. e., the development of organizational life is endangered by different 
possibilities of distorition in d i f f e r e n t h is tor ica l phases . T h e peculiar danger 
of distortion of an administrative mechanism getting into a solid, „grown-up" 
age is the bureaucratic habit. That is to say, as long as the organization is 
still young, there is but a smaller probability for this form of bureaucracy 
31 Marshall E. Dimock, Bureaucracy self-examined. Publ. in: Reader in bueau-
cracy. Ed.: R. K. Merton — A. P. Gray — B. Hockey — H. C. Selvin. Illinois, 
1960, 2 nd ed., p. 402; F. Morstein Marx, Einführung in die Bürokratie. Neuwied, 
1959, p. 38. 
32 The last stage of development of the organizational senescence is caricatured 
very appropriately, even in the title, by Parkinson, in Chapter „Intichitis or 
Paretic Paralysis". Cf.: C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law or the school of 
self-assertion. Budapest, 1964, pp. 135 et sq. (Hungarian translation). 
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being possibly created. We shall discuss lateron, when speaking in details 
about the measures to be applied against the bureaucratic habit, why the 
,,young" organizations are more resistent to these harmful tendencies. We 
are, anyhow, mentioning already here that the socialist revolutionary practice 
has produced a lot of formulae with the help of which the mechanism can be 
supplied with fresh energies, preventing, resp. finishing the organizational 
handicaps cennected with „senescence". 
This problem appears on a higler level of the socialist organizational 
development similarly to any society of an organization of high degree. When 
the fight against the bourgeois state forms was a central question in this 
country, there consequently belonged to smashing to pieces the old apparatus 
also the liquidation of the bureaucratic habit. On the other hand, the deve-
lopment and improvement of the socialist administrative organization, mani-
fested, partly in the formalization of the organization (arranged competen-
ces, programmed functioning, etc.), are again laying a new stress, from an-
other aspect, upon the struggle against the peculiar bureaucratic danger of 
formalism. A bureaucratic habit is the style of working with bad result that 
may appear in case of an organization of high level, of a procedure regu-
lated far-reaching. The harmful manifestations of „redtapism" are anyway 
formalist mistakes. The bureaucratic habit comes about if in a strongly for-
malized organization the revolutionary conscience of law in the administra-
tion, that has meant a compass in the procedures non-programmed, becomes 
blunted. A formalist administrative specialist can reason his procedure and 
decision in almost hundred ' percentage, refferring to the various norms. Ne-
vertheless, the part, being extremely little in a single case, in which he 
wrongly or incorrectly grasps some rule — or in which he does not know 
a relevant rule — m^y conduce to thoroughly bad and obviously incorrect 
decision. We must reckon with the fact that a highly regulated administra-
tive organization makes blunted at some persons, even in socialist circums-
tances and under certain conditions, the socialist revolutionary conscience 
of law. 
In the first, comparatively unregulated, phase of the socialist administ-
rative organization the main opportunity for mistakes was to be found in 
the lack of formal guarantees with the help of which it would have been 
possible to prevent the administrative decisions that were well-intentioned 
from the revolutionary point of view yet having a pernicious effect because 
of hurting the legal interests of citizens. The revolutionary conscience of law 
of the administrators has surmounted, by and large, the problem originated 
in the lack of legal rules or in their shortcomings. Already Robespierre called 
the attention to that the revolutionary firmness of administrators may sub-
stitute the legal rules.33 That could be, of course, but a transitory solution. 
The revolutionary conscience of law cannot substitute at all for a detailed 
regulation of the relations and for the possibly most exact fixation of the 
procedures. At present, however, a synthesis is doubtlessly contained in the 
demand that after the formal constituents elaborated we mustn't forget the 
care for, and development of, the revulutionary conscience of law of the 
administrators, either, because they cannot be familiar with the unprog-
rammed procedural pahses and the details of the different rules themselves. 
33 Cf.: M. Robespierre's memoirs. Budapest, 1944, p. 83. (Hungarian transl.). 
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a) What is manifested the institutional bureaucratic habit in, or an other-
wise formulated constitutional „senescence"? The literature of organizational 
science considers, uniformly enough, the deformation of the style of leading 
the primary starting point of the manifestations following the senescence of 
an organization. A bureaucratic structure of leadership may develop as a 
result of highly different factors. Among them there are personal endow-
ments like rigidity, an inclination to formalism, etc. The organizational dis-
tortion is magnified if the leading cannot uphold the level concerning the 
more and more growing professional political requirements. Then it is behind 
with the self-instruction, does not know the sociological normativities of the 
institutional structures, etc. A leadership being behind with the requirements 
is limiting the way of unfolding of talents within the institution because' it 
instinctively imagines an adversary in every subordinate waking, with his 
particularly good work, the thought in the organs on a higher dejgree of hier-
archy that he is not irreplaceable. 
The institutional bureaucratic habit may develop in the relations between 
the exempted and not professional members of the body steering the organi-
zation in case of some disturbancies in the relation of a one-man manager 
and the body controlling him. In the course of the managing work, in the lea-
ders of the organizational life the conviction may develop that the successful 
solution of tasks has only one guarantee: his expert knowledge, organizatory 
ability, and the professional work of the apparatus under his management. 
The social factors of the organization can tell him „nothing new", their pro-
posals are not moving on the ground of reality, they don't reckon with the 
„exigencies" — i. e. with the purposes able to be realized by the administ-
rative organization under the given politico-economical conditions. Under cer-
tain conditions the professional leaders are inclined to be led to the conc-
lusion that the social factors do not (or do but in ,a very small degree) con-
tribute to deciding the problems on their merits, and in the field of execution 
they cannot propose any adequate methods for being usefully applied by 
the apparatus. 
At some territorial organizations there are deply rooted opinions, regar-
ded as objective normativities, that the actual decisions of the body — in 
spite of every contrary effort — are made but by a few men, the persons 
carrying out (owing to their long practical experience) professionally the ad-
ministrative work. The non-exempted members of the executive committees 
— they say for instance — cannot have the expert knowledge on a high 
enough level necessary for deciding the present extremely multilateral, tech-
. nical, economic and legal problems that need an enormous review. 
These opinions may reflect, in some places of our institutional system, 
the real facts, yet it would be a bureaucratic outlook to led by that to the 
conclusion that the social element is superfluous. If the facts described, above 
evidence a complete passivity of the social element so we have to change that 
situation, the way to that being, however, the restoration (or developing) of 
the proper functions of the social and professional organizational factors. 
This is not an easy task simple to be solved but we are referring to some 
of its elements as examples. If such tendencies are developing we must me-
ditate on the nominating work preparing the election of these bodily organs, 
whether or not in the course of that the persons proposed. for nomination 
were those which, inside the community, had really the greatest expert 
knowledge, practical experiences,, well-founded high reputation. On the other 
hand, an amendment of the communicating system became necessary for 
preventing the decisions of bodily organs from becoming merely formal. The 
not exempted members of bodily organs often do, namely, not possess the 
knowledge needed for taking part in the complex meritory decisions. The 
legal frames enable each of the members of the representative organ, in 
principle, to get these informations. Yet it seems f rom some experimences 
that this fact itself is not enough. We should have to see af ter that, through 
the „canals of communication", these indices of basic importance, etc. do reach 
every delegate. Some are interposing an objection that the delegates are 
informed in details about the economical (budget) capacity, the organizational 
etc. conditions by the reports and proposals. About that we can only say 
that, unfortunately, the documents yielding informations are, to some extent, 
difficult to be surveyed, resp to be understood by those who are not familiar 
with the special terminology and dividing points of view of the administra-
tive branch. 
b) The bureaucratic habit that begins to develop on the side of the lea-
dership of organization may weave through some details of the administ-
rative mechanism. In these components of the organization there are beco-
ming dominant some peculiarities satirized and unmasked in the belles-lett-
res, as well; however, the defense against their subversive social effect is not 
at all a simple problem. 
One form of the manifestation of the bureaucratized administrative orga-
nizational habit of harmful effect is the development of a peculiar official 
system of the defence of prestige.34 In a bureaucratized organization, the di-
rection of the conformity of the civil servants has a harmful influence on 
the basic aims of the organization.35 In the division of labour of the admi-
nistrative organization, the officials become more and more aware of the 
efficiency of their work depending upon the cooperation of their fellow offi-
cials. An element of administration, being however adequate, may be diffe-
rently valued depending upon the good will or bad will of specialists that 
take part in carriying out the task. That is the cause of the strong confor-
mity existing between the members of the expert apparatuses: I must be 
loyal to my colleagues as the administrative mechanism is such that my 
detail work, even if carried out with the best intention, diligence and expert 
knowledge, may be. demonstrated negative, ineffective and inadequate in the 
processes of t h e whole administration. 
The members of the organization that are inclined to bureaucracy do 
acknowledge unconditionally the primacy and „spiritual superiority" of the 
entire organization, the office. The interest of office (in a bureaucratized 
organization) is separated and overcomes the purpose for the service of 
34 About the bureaucratic prestige cf.: N. J. Powell, Personnel administration 
in government. Englewood Cliffs. N. J., 1956, pp. 22 et sq. 
35 About the overconformity of officials cf.: R. K. Merton, The nature and 
sources of pathological bureaucratic behavior. Ed. by Robert Dubin,• Human relations 
in administration. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962, pp. 151 et sq.; 
F. Morstein Marx, Einführung in die Bürokratie. Neuwied, 1959, pp. 39 et sq.; P. M. 
Blau, The dynamics of bureaucracy. Chicago—London, 2 nd ed., 1963, pp. 232 et sq. 
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which the organization was created. This is one of the bases of the' develop-
m e n t of a separate mentality of officials. 
The conformity of the members of the bureaucratized organziation is 
manifested in the defence of the civil service prestige, in one of its most 
extreme forms. They try to justify even, the obviously wrong, erroneous, 
inefficient dispositions, made by one memeber of the organ or by another 
one, with the help of a grotesque conception of the official authority. The 
basis of that defence of prestige is an „obligation of mutual defence", origi-
nating in an increased conformity. Any civil servant may get into a situation 
— either in consequence of an objective cause or because of his own perso-
nal circumstances — where he can be liberated from the danger of individual 
responsibility only by a mutual taking of responsibility. In a bureaucratic 
organization, therefore, the lines of responsibility — that are anyway to be 
observed more and more difficultly, owing to the division of labour — are 
to be surveyed even more difficultly, owing to the defence of prestige.. The 
overconformity of specialists — for some time and till some level — is able 
to defend the members of a bureaucratic organization on the „basis of prin-
ciple" that „everybody may commit mistakes", to-day I have got into a situa-
tion like that but tomorrow you will get into, our mutual interest is „to help 
one another". 
The „defence of prestige" by officials is taking collective responsibility 
by the whole bureaucratic organization in cases where against some member 
of its there exists the danger to be called to individual account. The office 
knows that it is anyway exposed to some odium in such cases — however 
cleverly it is whitewashed. Yet they can defend their misconstrued mutual 
interests by decomposing the burden of the individual responsibility into so 
small details which the whole collective is able „to forbear with". The „de-
fence of prestige" of a bureaucratic organization has, therefore, the funda-
mental aim to exculpate an official f rom being called to individual account 
and from the consequences of that. 
Any elements of a bureaucratic structure are bound by the „professional 
interest". To be sure, conformity is not of the same intensity between the 
different degrees of the official hierarchy but, after all, it joins the entire 
bureaucratical organziation in some degree of common interests. This inter-
nal conformity, as well, is participating in the endeavour of the bureauc-
ratic organization to resist any change that would endanger the interest al-
ready „harmonized".36 That is the source of one of the very important symp-
t oms of t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c o rgan iza t ion : resistance to every planned change 
touching the personal staff. The office does not defend, of course, the persons 
contravening gravely the „spirit of specialists", violating the norm made 
36 The difficult position of an administrative reformer, the antagonism against 
any rationalizing blueprints, and generally the grotesque ,,red-tapism" are drawn 
wery plastically by Balzac s novel, „The civil servants". He characterizes Rabour-
din's reforms-plans and the official antagonism against them in the following 
way: „His system, therefore, was based on a reorganization and manifested in 
new administrative technical terms. This is, perhaps, the cause of hate brought 
about by reformers against themselves. The cancellations required by the. impro-
vements, misunderstood at first, are threatening the vital conditions of those 
wanting not to accept any change in their conditions." Balzac, Comédie humaine, 
vol. VI, Budapest, 1963, p. 891 (Hungarian translation). 
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by the group of harmful nature. The bureaucratic organization endeavours, 
too, to throw out of itself those making themselves noticed by a „too good 
work", and it „lets drop" its members that, because of their poor professional 
or moral endowments, could not be raised, upon an acceptable level indi-
spensable for preserving the professional authority, although their respon-
sibilities were repeatedly undertaken by their colleagues. 
The resistance of the bureaucratic organization after a personal change 
in leadership is obvious.37 A leader brought from outside is particularly inc-
lined to deal, as a first step, with major reform blueprints concerning the 
functioning of the organization. He is, however, awakened by the bureauc-
ratic organization, in a mild or rude way, to the official conformity tha t 
he must adjust himself to, otherwise loosing the „air for breathing around 
him". The large-scale conceptions, formed by the new leaders concerning or-
ganization and function of the organization, are very often prepared, in fact, 
without knowing the personal, organizational material conditions and, there-
fore, they may contain much of irreality. And the bureaucratic organization 
resists even the plans of the changes being highly actual and sometimes ex-
pressly unavoidable. The greater routine the apparatus has and the stronger 
conformity is, the more the new leader is resisted by the officials. 
The office endeavours in a lot of ways to discredit the „reform plans".38 
First of all it demonstrates the responsibility they may be connected with. 
The result of reforms depends upon a lot of factors that are not depending 
on the leader: he has, therefore, because of his hazardous plans, to take thé 
risk without having practically any possibility of a control. A vivid descrip-
tion of the danger of the individual risk and responsibility is the first ob-
stacle thrown by the office against the reforms. A rather energetic leader 
will, anyhow, be reluctant to abandon therefore alone his main conceptions. 
However, even a leader starting with a great initiative will experience how 
cunning and stubborn and, at the same time, elusive the resistance of the 
bureaucratic specialists is against any reform. The fight between the leader 
and bureaucracy is, of course, not of a preestablished consequence, but qua-
lities much higher than average ones are needed for crushing the resistance 
by a bureaucratic mechanism of routine. The leader needs an extraordinary 
vigilance, rapid glance, professional-political firmness, strategical and tac-
tical sense for realizing his purposes completely even despite of the resis-
tance of office. Bureaucracy tries everything to discredit the conceptions of 
the leader, to present them the public opinion as nonsense, etc. The bureauc-
ratic resistance quietly sabotages the work, if possible, in the course of the 
procedure of realizing the aims, and even it takes definite „steps" to prevent 
37 About the „resistance" of officials, its forms and content, see in details: 
Marshall E. Dimock, Bureaucracy self-examined. Ed. in: Reader in bureaucracy. 
Ed. : R. K. Merton — A. P. Gray — B. Hockey —. C. Selvin. Illinois. 2nd ed. 1960r 
pp. 403 et sq. 
38 A lot of statements, affecting scholarly airs, are made by the bourgeois 
group-sociology about conditions and methods of the „group-norm": There are 
discussed problems like „conformity: a clue to influence" or „why the leader has to-
be conform", ect. (Cf.: Sindney Verba, Small groups and political behavior. Prin-
ceton, 1961, pp. 186, 188.). On the other hand, they are giving the capitalistic under-
takings and bourgeois administration councils, that are not all usless, in problems 
like: „how can be a leader reformer and conformist", etc. (S. Verba: op. cit., pp. 
196 et sq.). 
the prospective results, if there is no particular fear of being detected. Bu-
reaucracy, for realizing its „own official plans", is gathering its personal 
connections developed during the old cooperation with higher instances of 
the organizational hierarchy. And it tries to turn the major bodies against 
the „unreflecting", „revolutionizing" leader through the delegates control-
ling the administrative mechanism and being in good acquaitance and con-
nection with the office since a longer time. The leader will experience how 
many legal, procedural impediments will be brought up in the most different 
phases of the operations to be discharged, etc. 
The observation of the force of the bureaucratic resistance will convince 
a number of leaders experimenting with reforms that they can reckon with 
the support of their purposes only in case of some compromises. The new 
leader must comply with the bureaucratic structure, he must accept the „of-
ficial spirit" (that the office is above its members, I'art pour I'art), he must 
evidence that he grows comfortable with the members of organization (ente-
ring the mutual defence system), he must declare that he fundamentally 
accepts the old group norms as valuable, etc. Then the homogeneity of the 
administrative organization is getting restored in the spirit of bureaucracy, 
and the appearance of a harmonious state of repose, appearing productive 
in the eyes of outside observers, is substituting the phase „charged with 
conflicts." This „harmony" is of course, a state of unproductivity following 
bureaucracy, that succeeds is solving every problem „with good results", seen 
on the surface, but the only important thing for it being to show the appea-
rance of a good work. 
c) The fight against the „official spirit" developed at the bureaucratic 
structure is the most difficult form of the struggle against bureaucracy. The 
organizational overgrowth and the procedural mistakes can essentially be 
derived from formal causes, therefore the improvement of the organizational 
solutions will doubtlessy be helpful, and even a complete elimination of the 
failure can take placs alone by amending the organization, as it is possible 
under the given concrete conditions. On the other hand, the harmful conse-
quences of the bureaucratic organization cannot be solved by amending me-
rely the formal (organizational and legal) framework. The elimination of 
,,red-tapism" is needing a multilateral treatment, „medical interventions" of 
different character. This form of the developed bureaucracy is considered 
in the bourgeois literature almost irremediable. This is, of course, but a ge-
neralization valid only for the bourgeois relations, not for those in Socialism. 
The socialist revolutionary practice has created the guarantees in case of 
which this organizational disease cannot get a developed form. For preven-
tion, we have partly to restore certain elements of the revolutionary tradi-
tions — where they are forgotten or have become merely formal — or partly 
— in case of growth of the. administrative organization — the socialist science 
has to answer the new problems produced by the formal side coming strongly 
into prominence. The methods and forms of. the fight against these bureauc-
ratic distortions are detailed in a lot of branches of social sciences. The foun-
dation is laid by Marxism-Leninism. Against the formal sides of bureauc-
racy efficient weapons are offered by the political and legal sciences, as well 
by the science of organization. For revealing the essence of the bureaucratic 
structure and for starting of the elimination of . it as a social manifestation, 
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some structure-sociological knowledge is indispensable, completed by some 
investigations of social-psychology and. individual psychology that reveal the 
individual features of the persons participating in the organizational struc-
t u r e a n d their connections with bureaucratic tendencies. T h e ch iefs of t h e 
administrative organizational leading, and the representative organs control-
ling them, have, therefore, to apply the results, of.every science to-day, for 
finding measures to cease the most different causes that evoke bureaucratic 
tendencies. 
A completely detailed treatment of the procedures used against bureauc-
racy would exceed our present task. And we cannot follow, either, even if 
analyzing the manifestations of bureaucracy, t h e e x a m p l e of t h e b o u r g e o i s 
scholars who, after having described the „disease", consider their task ful -
filled. What are the measures recommended by the revolutionary practice, 
Marxism-Leninis, and the different ramified sciences for fighting against bu-
reaucracy? In a very brief account, risking even to be misunderstood, we can 
outline these, as follows. 
On every level of the socialist mechanism, at the top of power there are 
standing representative organs. Lenin saw that the function of the proper 
representative organs may prevent the development of bureaucratic tenden-
cies in the administration. The socialist representation can respond to task 
if it unites in itself the functions of legislation (decision) and execution.39 
The socialist representation has to control de facto the work of the or-
gans of general, competence and of those with specialized power, as well. 
The representation, and the citizens directly, must get an institutional 
framework, assuring the real conditions for being able to establish the res-
ponsibility on every level of administration for the activity of the organs 
and persons, and, if necessary, to call them to account. . 
A fundamental guarantee of realizing the responsibility is the right to 
recall each of the civil servants (and expert) (revocation). The legal possibi-
lity in itself is, anyhow, not enough since the practical employment of it has 
some socio-structural conditions, too. The development of an inclination to 
the bureaucratic separation can be prevented partly by a not too long term 
of mandate (frequent reelections), that is to say, that after the first signs 
of „separation" the members of the apparatus may get into other spheres 
of activity. The organization is remaining elastic and vivid : only if it gets 
on with being in a close connection with the society. In the Soviet revolution 
the organs were frequently reelected and therefore no separatory tendency 
would develop there. Going back to the revolutionary experiences, we can 
fight with measures of the „primitive" democracy the most efficiently aga-
inst the organizational „senescence".40 
Even if the administration is controlled representatively, it is very im-
portant that is the deciding leading positions of the specialized apparatus 
there are leaders knowing also the special points of view and being able to 
reveal the useful signs from the social notices and claims, however naive or 
impatiently pretentious they often be. The opinions of „laymen" generally 
39 Just by that is distinguished the socialist representation from the parliamen-
tarism joint with bureaucracy. Cf.: Lenin, State and revolution. Lenin's Works 
(Hungarian transi.), Vol. 25, Budapest, 1952. pp. 455, 523. 
40 Cf.: Lenin: op. cit., pp..451, 523. 
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contain, even under the most unfavourable conditions, some intellectual e l e -
ments and suggestions that are worth while to be thought over. From the-
point of view of fighting against bureaucracy it is very important that at the-
strategical points of the hierarchy of administrative organization there stand 
persons being able, because of their individual habits, living social connec-
tions, to resist to be becoming one-sided, and leading in the organization under-
their control individually the elimination of such distortions in the persons; 
that appear inclined to ,,red-tapism" as a consequence of specialization. Wei-
should call the attetion to that fact in the phase of our people's democratic.-
state construction where, in connection with the formally adequate proce-
dures, the demands are growing more and more, and there may appear a lso 
the germs of the dangers that the types of a leader, satisfying more the-
forms, are appreciated more by their superior authorities than the brave: 
initiators. The increased claims are, of course, both-sided in connection with, 
the leading. The particularly worth administrative leader-type is in whom, 
the special expert knowledge (containing also a knowledge of the procedural., 
formules) is connected with a sence that can select and use the warnings;: 
coming from the representative organs and other social connections. 
The administrative leader can be informed about the bureaucratic d i s -
tortions in several forms. The most severe cases are published in the press,.. 
as well; the delegates often refer to them during their interpellations; the.-
objections and interventions at the report-back mettings of the council mem-
bers, the so-called anouncements of common concern, the individual com-
plaints are all institutions giving the leader a survey over the inelasticity 
of the organization, the beginnings of the development of a peculiar „red-
. tapism", of an offical „prestige" that is unterstood erroneously, etc. A Po-
pular Front organization that is functioning with substantial success may give 
warnings, as well, towards the leaders of the administrative organization if" 
an undesirable formalism appears either in its work or in that of its e m p -
loyees. The value of the habit concerning the prevention and elimination of 
the bureaucratic structure is characterized, as a rule, by the fact how cons-
cienciously the administrative leader is dealing with the warings f rom these-
sources, how much he can treat of the informations showing the true sources; 
of the troubles, leaving out of consideration the possibly considerable quantity 
of the unfounded, erroneous observations that were coming from false i n -
formations. 
* * * 
The bureaucratic dangers, as mentioned, have first of all in the domain?, 
of the administrative organization. Inside that type of organizations the-
„agar-agar" is — owing to the character of organizations — particularly-
favourable to it. It is, therefore, no mere chance that the investigation of" 
the bureaucratic manifestations and the testing of measures used against:.: 
them have begun inside the administrative organ system. The state cons t ruc -
tion has been successful, even so far, in its struggle against the bureaucratic^ 
manifestations observed in the administration — partly by the help of science,., 
partly by using the acquired experimental material with a simple practical, 
generalization. 
The forms of bureaucracy may, anyhow, appear at state organs of other-
type, as well.' Every authoritative state organ has also elements of activity -
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•of administrative character and in such fields the bureaucratic distortions 
-can occur. The recommended measures of the antibureaucratic struggle must 
be „adopted" to the peculiar relations of other organt-types, since the forms 
employed with success in the administration cannot be applied simply to 
these organs. 
Bureaucracy under the modern living conditions may be considered, too, 
as a general organizational disease. The state leading in Socialism has always 
.struggled against the bureaucratic dangers of administration in an organized 
form. It is a much more important problem to fight against the bureaucratic 
"tendencies m a n i f e s t e d in t h e state organizations without the character of 
•authority, in a methodic, well-weighed and unflagging way. A survey of our 
daily press can convince us very fast that the overwhelming majori ty of 
the problems showing up the elements of bureaucracy have arisen not so 
much from the activity of state organs as authorities but from the work of 
undertakings, institutions, instituts. These problems cannot, of course, be 
•always separated from the administrative activity of State, nevertheless, 
there are more and more numerical data of complaints concerning expressedly 
the supplying work of under-takings, the peculiar activity of these instituons. 
'These manifestations of bureaucracy embitter the lives of thousands of people. 
Bureaucracy, therefore, is to be treated of as a general sociological pheno-
menon, a real danger in any organizational structure. 
It is important that the fight against bureaucracy comprises, under the 
"lead of govermental organs, the entire organizational mechanism carrying out 
the concrete realization of public tasks. 
Under the conditions of Socialism, there are available extremely favou-
rable conditions for carrying out a comprehensive fight, including every 
•organizational form, not only intermittently but continuously and well-
organized. While the fight against the bureaucratic forms of appearance like 
these has begun by the bourgeois economical, supplying mechanism, in prin-
ciple limited by the points of view of profit, and while there the administra-
tive organization is not at all interested in prosecuting bureaucracy, the 
socialist organization may form a judgment of the whole problem on the 
basis of humanitarianism, f rom the pont of view of the public interest. In the 
.-socialist state and social mechanism, the leading organs may intervene 
-everywhere immediately — both in the administration and in the system of 
undertakings and other institutions. This possibility can be used of in a 
-rather organized way by the controlling organs. The basic knowledge of the 
-sociology of bureaucracy should be made a part of the professional continua-
tive education organized at almost every organization. This would contribute 
to thrusting into prominence the prevention instead of the elimination of 
•conditions of the manifestations of a bureaucracy already met with. 
These statements do refer, with some amendments, to the social organi-
zations, associations, etc, as well. A social organ is exposed, in principle, in 
-a lower degree, to the danger of being bureaucratic, as the social bases of the 
mechanism are broader and more vigorous than those of the typical formal 
organs. Number and complexity of the tasks of some of these may, however, 
"be increased in such an extant that it can become necessary int that domain, 
too, to study the danger of a bureaucratic organizational distortion arid to 
"begin an institutional defence against it. 
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